STNB2024(37a edició)
Overview and extension of root-based attacks against PLWE instances
Ponentes
Rodrigo Martín
Resumen
The Polynomial Learning With Errors problem (PLWE) serves as the background of two of the four cryptosystems standardised in July 2022 by the National Institute of Standards and Technology to replace non-quantum resistant current primitives like those based in RSA, finite field based Diffie-Hellman and its elliptic curve analogue. Although PLWE is highly believed to be quantum resistant, unlike other post-quantum proposals like multivariate and some code based ones, this fact has not yet been established. Moreover, several vulnerabilities have been encountered for a number of specific instances. In a search for more flexibility, it becomes fully relevant to study the robustness of PLWE based on other polynomials, not necessarily cyclotomic. In 2015, Lauter et al. found a good number of attacks based on different features of the roots of the polynomial. In the present talk we present an overview of the approximations made against PLWE derived from these work, along with several new attacks which refine those by Lauter exploiting a) the size of the roots and b) the order of the trace of roots over finite extensions of the finite field. This is joint work with I. Blanco-Chacón and R. Durán.
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